خرید و دانلود نسخه کامل کتاب GETTING WHAT YOU WANT CL – PDF

آنتونی رابینز میگه : من در 40 سالگی به جایی رسیدم که برای رسیدن بهش 82 سال زمان لازمه و این رو مدیون کتاب خواندن زیاد هستم.

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My intention in this book is polemical, but not rhetorical. For while I shall try to persuade readers that the whole idea of a liberal morality is in the end untenable, the very possibility of my doing so rests on a sense of, and a confidence in, a rationality which it is liberalism’s great achievement to have bequeathed us. Thus an underlying theme is that liberalism’s loss of confidence in a universal and impartial rationality, resulting in its transformation into the series of relativisms now described as postmodernism, is misplaced; but that the seeds of this transformation have lain dormant in the liberal tradition. In particular, it is liberalism’s difficulties in justifying morality which are central to that transfor mation and which show why, its achievements notwithstanding, liberal morality is in the end conceptually inadequate to the point of being corrosive. My argument is simply that liberal morality is unsustainable because it cannot offer a rationally adequate account either of morality as a fact of everyday life or of any possible justification of moral principles and moral demands. I hope to lay the ground, in the longer run, for the possibility of a thoroughly rationalistic account and justification of morality; to refute both amoralists who reject the claims of morality upon them and (philosophical) sceptics who, however they may actually behave, reject the possibility of any rational justification of (even their own) moral actions and judgements. In rejecting liberal morality and liberal theories of morality, then, I am emphatically not rejecting the liberal conception of rationality. In particular, I share the aspirations of classical no less than later nineteenth- and earlier twentieth-century liberals to a universal and impartial rationality—even if imperfectly realized, in that tradition as elsewhere, and even if too often limited to questions of means rather than extending also to ends