خرید و دانلود نسخه کامل کتاب The Political Economy of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – Original PDF

.1 What is China’s Motivation for iMpleMenting CpeC? Admittedly, there are several reasonable arguments against CPEC.Pakistan’s geological conditions pose a significant technological and engineering obstacle. The China-Pakistan border is mountainous and roads and rail- ways face threats including earthquakes and mudslides. Under these con- ditions, roads, railways, and oil pipelines constructed under CPEC projects will necessarily have very high maintenance and repair costs. Especially when compared to ocean shipping, inland transportation appears quite inefficient. Moreover, there are many poor, underdeveloped regions in China with inadequate infrastructure and that lack a social safety net; why should China make FDI in Pakistan instead of investing domestically? While these arguments are reasonable, China apparently sees value in CPEC and the BRI which far exceeds any considerations about these eco- nomic costs or domestic factor. A discussion of the CPEC project must begin with an analysis of China’s motivations for the BRI more generally. Before the Chinese government officially announced the BRI in 2013, the idea to develop the Silk Road Economic Belt came about as a consequence of two important historical events. The first event was the 2008 global financial crisis. This crisis had an enormous impact on developed countries which had been China’s tra- ditional export markets. These countries were no longer able to absorb all of China’s products. Prior to this, for the thirty years leading up to the BRI, China had exercised a “blue ocean” strategy in which domestic 1 CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR AND THE BELT AND ROAD… 4 economic development was promoted through the exportation of goods to Western countries via oceanic shipping. But after the 2008 global finan- cial crisis, this strategy began to appear unsustainable. The second event was that the territorial disputes intensified between China and several neighboring countries amid the US’ adoption of the “pivot to Asia” strat- egy in 2009. This placed immense additional strategic pressure on China, which in turn invigorated nationalist sentiment within China. Under such complicated historical circumstances, the westward “opening up” strategy with its aim to promote the economic integration of Eurasia by building the New Silk Road Economic Belt became an important hedging strategy through which China could promote free trade and maintain world peace [2].1 To China, in the face of increasing economic difficulties, the essence of the BRI is to defend free trade by opening new international markets, identify new opportunities for economic growth, and create a hedge against market turbulence in developed countries. In addition, China con- siders a turn toward Eurasia as vital to the avoidance of direct conflicts with traditional sea powers because, in this way, it would no longer rely solely on the Asian Pacific region for its economic connection to the world, thereby maintaining world peace and reducing the intense geopo- litical pressures of the Asia-Pacific region. The BRI is geo-economic in nature. Traditional geopolitics character- izes international relations as a zero-sum game emphasizing conflicts of interest and competition among nation states. In contrast, geo-economics attaches importance to the shared interests and cooperation among nation states in international relations and emphasizes the search for win-win solutions. It holds that every country could gain more opportunities as long as they cooperate with each other to increase the size of the market. This perspective lies at the BRI: it is essentially a hedge against the strate- gic pressures put on China from the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Hedging in this case is neither friendly diplomacy nor confrontation, but simply an option that induces cooperation by demon- strating the costs of non-cooperation.2 With long coastlines and vast inland territories, China’s geological loca- tion boasts strategic advantages in geo-economics. Western China is 1 Gao Bai, “Gaotie yu zhongguo 21shiji dazhanlue” (High-speed Rail and China’s Strategy for the 21st Century), Jingji Guanchabao (The Economic Observer) (March 2011): 41–42. 2 Gao Bai, “Gaotie yu zhongguo 21shiji dazhanlue” (High-speed Rail and China’s Strategy for the 21st Century), Jingji Guanchabao (The Economic Observer) (March 2011): 41–42. B. GAO 5 connected to Central and South Asia and is not far away from the Middle East where are located the world’s main sources of oil, natural gas, and many other minerals. Connecting countries of abundant energy, resources, population, capital, and technology, Eurasian railways and roads can mobi- lize production factors and further improve the relative global economic status of these countries, and affect the future international political and economic order.3 China may put itself in a strong and favorable position within the international political economy if it utilizes its unique geo- graphic advantages to create a hedge for itself. To do so, China must build railways and other infrastructure to promote economic integration with the Eurasian continent and promote the economic integration of the Pacific Rim. For China, the twenty-first century can be either a Pacific century, or a Eurasian century, or both. If the Pacific countries are hostile to China, it can turn westward to promote the economic integration of Eurasia; if the Eurasian countries are hostile to China, it can turn eastward to facilitate the economic integration of the Pacific Rim. If both sides show goodwill toward China, it can develop simultaneously in both directions.4 Why did China select CPEC to be the BRI’s pilot project? Unlike other neighboring countries, Pakistan offers unique political support for CPEC that other countries do not. Since both China and Pakistan consider each other all-weather strategic partners, domestic polit- ical support for cooperation with China is very strong in Pakistan; in fact, Chinese cooperation as a national policy is unanimously accepted by all political parties in Pakistan and has historically occurred through both governmental and military channels. In addition, Pakistan’s political rela- tions with other major powers are not as close as those it has with China, so it is less likely for Pakistan to be influenced by other countries when implementing CPEC projects. Perhaps most importantly, the Pakistani government recognizes that CPEC is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the country’s economic development. In consideration of these interna- tional and domestic conditions, therefore, starting the BRI from the southern route of the Eurasian land bridge seems to be China’s best choice. 3 Gao Bai, “Gaotie yu zhongguo 21shiji dazhanlue” (High-speed Rail and China’s Strategy for the 21st Century), Jingji Guanchabao (The Economic Observer) (March 2011): 41–42. 4 Gao Bai, “Gaotie yu zhongguo 21shiji dazhanlue” (High-speed Rail and China’s Strategy for the 21st Century), Jingji Guanchabao (The Economic Observer) (March 2011): 41–42. 1 CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR AND THE BELT AND ROAD… 6 Pakistan’s geographic location is of great importance to China. Whether China’s BRI will succeed depends largely on whether China can develop and maintain good relations with neighboring countries and gain political support from them. The importance of a country’s geographic location lies in the fact that location is a precondition for both geopolitics and geo- economics. Without first considering the geographical environment of international political economy, it would be impossible to assess the value of various BRI route options in the context of big power relations. For instance, if Sino-US relations were stable, Pakistan’s value to China, either as a pathway to the Indian Ocean, or as a route across the Eurasian land bridge, would be relatively low. If such were the case, China could ensure its ocean shipping route through the Pacific and Indian oceans and it would not need a land path to reach the Indian Ocean, nor a route across the Eurasian continent. Similarly, Pakistan’s value to China would also be relatively low if China and Russia had an established strategic alliance, because in this case, Russia, rather than Pakistan could serve as China’s main route to enter the European market. China has given top priority to its diplom